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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Judicial decisions reported in this area in 1961 clustered primarily
around procedural issues. Unlike prior years substantive matters were
less in number and importance.
APPEAL PROCEDURES
The proper filing of an appeal notice is jurisdictional. The supreme
court spoke twice on this rigid technicality last year. In State ex rel.
Howard v. Industrial Commission,' involving a claim for a death award,
a writ of procedendo was sought to command the Industrial Commission
to order the Regional Board of Review to proceed with the hearing of an
appeal from a decision of the Administrator of the Bureau of Workmen's
Compensation. The petition for the writ was denied. The claimant's
application for the Administrator's reconsideration of a death claim was
filed eleven days after the denial of the claim by the Deputy Adminis-
trator. The court held that the Administrator was without jurisdiction
to reconsider the application under Ohio Revised Code section 4123.515
which makes mandatory a ten day period as the limitation for such a fil-
ing, and that thus the merits of the claim were not before the Regional
Board. The same court in a per curiam opinion2 disallowed an amend-
ment to an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission to the
common pleas court. The court held that the appeal to the common
pleas court must designate the name of the employer and contain a claim
number, that such requisites were jurisdictional under Ohio Revised Code
section 4123.519, and that they could not be added by amendment after
the expiration of the statutory period for filing such an appeal.
Regarding appeals from the Industrial Commission to the common
pleas court, a court of appeals' likewise emphasized the jurisdictional
mandate of the workmen's compensation statute. Although upon refusal
by the Commission to entertain an appeal from the Regional Hearing
Board, a claimant may file his notice of appeal in the common pleas
court, that notice is fatally defective when the date included in the notice
of appeal is the date of the Commission's order rather than the date of
the Regional Hearing Board's decision. Ohio Revised Code section
4123.519 requires that the notice of appeal must specify the date of the
decision appealed from. Furthermore, the court held that the defective
notice cannot be amended upon the expiration of the jurisdictional sixty-
1. 171 Ohio St. 447, 172 N.E.2d 1 (1961). See also discussion in Administrative Law and
Procedure section, p. 431 supra.
2. Starr v. Young, 172 Ohio St. 317, 175 N.E.2d 514 (1961).
3. Gordon v. Young, 173 N.E.2d 373 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
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day period after the date of the decision. The supreme court dismissed
the appeal from this "restrictive court of appeals" decision.4
Under the statutes5 appeal is permitted to the court of common pleas
from the Regional Board of Review if the Commission refuses an appeal.
Appeal to the court is precluded, however, until the Commission has
acted upon the application for reconsideration of the Regional Board's
decision.6
A compeniation case appealed to the common pleas court can be dis-
missed for want of prosecution after being regularly assigned for trial and
counsel notified.7 Want of prosecution by the employee does not entitle
the employer to a hearing and a dismissal on the merits. In another
case8 it was held that an employer could appeal a verdict of the common
pleas court under authority of Ohio Revised Code section 4123.519,
which instituted and defined such right to appeal, even though the claim
arose out of the employee's death occurring prior to enactment of the
statute, because the statute was procedural only and did not modify any
substantive rights of the claimant.
Where the Commission found that the claimant was permanently
and totally disabled and such disability was the result of advanced age
rather than an injury, a jurisdictional issue was presented and was ap-
pealable to the common pleas court.' Prior to the 1955 amendment, the
extent of dependency of the claimant in a death case, whether partial or
total, in the event some dependency was recognized, was not appealable
to the common pleas court."0 Ohio Revised Code section 4123.519, en-
acted in 1955, has radically amended the appeals procedure. Parents of a
decedent, granted partial dependency status, can now appeal to the court
of common pleas the denial of their application for total dependency."
AUTHORITY OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Several cases last year dealt with issues involving the Commission's
authority. One widow sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Com-
mission to vacate an order denying an additional award for her husband's
death based on the employer's violating a specific safety requirement of
4. Gordon v. Young, 171 Ohio St. 446, 173 N.E.2d 379 (1961). See also discussion in
Administrative Law and Procedure section, p. 430 supra.
5. OHIO REv. (ODE § 4123.516, 4123.519.
6. Bunch v. Scanlon, 172 N.E.2d 188 (Ohio C.P. 1959). See also discussion in Adminis-
trative Law and Procedure section, p. 429 supra.
7. Lopez v. Scanlon, 175 NE.2d 118 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
8. Mace v. Scanlon, 111 Ohio App. 309, 171 NB.2d 922 (1960).
9. Wentzell v. Columbus Bolt& Forging Co., 112 Ohio App. 552, 176 N.E.2d 866 (1961).
10. 125 Ohio Laws 903, 1016 (1953).
11. Very v. Young, 178 N.E.2d 112 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
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the Commission's bulletin. 2 Decedent was killed by electrocution when
his crane boom struck electric wires. Section 161 of Bulletin 202 had
stated that when necessary to operate construction equipment near elec-
tric wires, "ample" clearance "should be provided." A recommendation
that a ten foot clearance "should be maintained" was also included. The
Ohio Supreme Court denied the writ on the ground that the Commis-
sion's bulletin was not a specific safety requirement imposed upon the
employer because it did not affirmatively establish a standard which the
employer could follow. One judge dissented. He contended that since
the Commission had specifically determined the cause of death to be a
violation of the safety requirement, the requirement was sufficiently cer-
tain in its nature to be interpreted and imposed against the employer.
Under the 1959 Amendments to the Ohio Revised Code, compensa-
tion for partial or permanent disability accrues and is payable to the em-
ployee from the date of last payment of compensation, or, in cases where
no previous compensation has been paid, from the date of injury.'3 A
claimant injured prior to the enactment of this accrual provision is like-
wise entitled to the accrual benefits, for, the matter being procedural and
not substantive, its retroactive application is not invalid.'4 It was also
held that if the Commission holds hearings at various times on the ques-
tion of whether a claimant is a handicapped worker and fails to consider
the handicapped worker provisions of Code section 4123.43, the em-
ployer may seek a writ of mandamus compelling the Commission to de-
termine whether the employer is entitled to an apportionment of the costs
between itself and the Surplus Fund provided for by the statute.'5
SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS
Course of Employment
Three cases were reported in 1961. A police officer driving his own
automobile from home to the police station to report for regular duty was
injured. The police department rule required officers to be prepared at
all times to act immediately on notice that their services were required.
The injury was not compensable for it did not arise out of nor did it
occur in the course of employment.' " An injury suffered by a worker
enroute to a mandatory examination by the Commission's medical staff
during consideration of the worker's claim for permanent partial disabil-
12. State ex rel. Hill v. Industrial Comm'n, 172 Ohio St. 115, 173 N.E.2d 890 (1961).
13. OHIo REv. CODE § 4123.571.
14. State ex rel. Smith v. Industrial Comm'n 112 Ohio App. 1, 174 N.E.2d 115 (1960).
15. State ex rel. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 175 N.E.2d 836 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1960).
16. Simerlink v. Young, 172 Ohio St. 433, 178 N.E.2d 168 (1961).
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ity also was not compensable.1 And for a similar reason, a worker in-
jured while trying to jump over his employer's parking lot fence could
not recover compensation. The worker was going to his automobile
parked in the lot to eat lunch during the regular lunch period."
Causal Relationship
No more difficult medico-legal issue arises than the crucial problem
of whether the physical condition of the injured employee is the direct
result of, or was proximately caused by, the employment incident. An
injury to one worker's left foot and leg was compensable, but when that
worker sought to prove a subsequent back ailment arising from the same
incident his claim was denied. The most favorable evidence supporting
this additional claim was that there was a "remotely possible" causal re-
lationship."
Accident and Itjury
A heart injury resulting from the force exerted by a workman to pre-
vent a loaded wheelbarrow from tipping sideways was not the result of
an accident. The claim stemming from this incident was not compen-
sable.2" The court relied on the Dripps doctrine, for the incident oc-
curred in 1954 prior to the statutory amendments of 1959.2
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PRACTICE
The Fee
Each year legal issues over attorney's fees appear to arise.2 The past
year was no exception. The Ohio Supreme Court held that where a con-
troversy occurs over the amount of the fee, the attorney cannot assert a
claim for a fee in any amount not fixed by the Commission in accordance
with Ohio Revised Code section 4123.06. Furthermore, in the absence
of a fee fixed by the Commission no lien of any amount exists against the
compensation check issued.
17. Carlson v. Young, 171 N.E.2d 736 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
18. Clites v. Young, 176 N.E.2d 741 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
19. Ulicny v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 174 N.E.2d 926 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
20. Stewart v. Young, 112 Ohio App. 433, 176 N.E.2d 322 (1960).
21. For a discussion of the statute, see Schroeder, Survey of Ohio Law - Workmen's Com-
pensation, 11 WESr. RES. L. REv. 453 (1960).
22. Schroeder, Survey of Ohio Law - Workmen's Compensation, 11 WEST. REs. L. REv.
453, 458 (1960); Schroeder, Survey of Ohio Law - Workmen's Compensation, 12 WEST.
REs. L. REV. 593, 594 (1961).
23. Adams v. Fleck, 171 Ohio St. 451, 172 NXE.2d 126 (1961). See also discussion in
Personal Property section, p. 508 supra. See Recent Decision, p. 608 infra.
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Unauthorized Practice
Developments in 1961 substantiated the prediction made in last
year's survey article that practice by laymen before the Commission and
Bureau of Workmen's Compensation "will become a major problem."24
One lower court case involved a breach of contract suit by an actuarial
corporation which had agreed to procure and maintain the lowest possible
rates for an employer by filing protests, opposing claimants, and protest-
ing rates. Such a contract was held unenforceable and against public
policy because the service performed constituted the unauthorized prac-
tice of law.25 The organized bar is undertaking affirmative action against
lay practice before the Commission and Bureau of Workmen's Compen-
sation. Armed with such decisions as the one reported above plus Mc-
Millen v. McCahan"6 and the recent case of In re Battelle Institute27 as
well as high court decisions from sister states, such as Hoffmeister v. Tod2 8
in Missouri, the bar associations have opened an aggressive attack on lay
compensation practitioners. At stake is the necessity for the Ohio Su-
preme Court to reconsider the guidelines laid down twenty-five years
ago in Goodman v. Beall.9 Here the court held that the appearance and
practice before the Commission prior to the disallowance of a claim and
the beginning of the old rehearing procedure was not ordinarily the prac-
tice of law. In 1955 the rehearing proceedings were abolished. The
Commission and Bureau today are entitled to a modern reconsideration
by the Ohio Supreme Court as to what constitutes the unauthorized prac-
tice of law in compensation cases. Certain language in the Goodman
case could still be important:
In keeping with an enlightened age, the act was designed to create
a new system, fair to both employee and employer, and to do away with
the vexations and protracted litigation which had proved so costly, ex-
haustive, and unsatisfactory, ofttimes resulting in great injustice.
In the vast majority of instances no special skill is required in the
preparation and presentation of claims.
Since the inception of the Workmen's Compensation Act it has been
common practice for laymen to assist an injured or diseased workman or
24. Schroeder, Survey of Ohio Law - Workmen's Compensation, 12 WEST. REs. L. REv.
593, 594 (1961).
25. Harrington Inc. v. Windmiller, 177 N.E.2d 816 (Ohio Munic. Ct. 1961).
26. 167 N.E.2d 541 (Ohio C.P. 1960). In this case a common pleas court enjoined a layman
from preparing appeals, filing forms, and giving advice to claimants before the Industrial
Commission as such activity constituted the unauthorized practice of law.
27. 172 N.E.2d 917 (Ohio C.P. 1961). The court held that salaried personnel of the legal
department of the patent section of the Battelle Memorial Institute engaged in the unauthor-
ized practice of law when they performed legal services regarding patents and inventions for
the industrial sponsers of the institute.
28. 349 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1961). A layman was held in contempt for engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law through advising members of the public as to their rights under
the Workmen's Compensation Law.
29. 130 Ohio St. 427, 200 N.E. 470 (1936).
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his dependents in the submission of a claim. Often this is done as an
accommodation by representatives of the employer or by representatives
of an organization to which a claimant may belong, and such usually
simple services are for the most part performed in an expeditious and
satisfactory manner. In our judgment this is not the practice of law; but
in so holding it is neither our intention nor purpose to modify the
definition of the practice of law announced in the first paragraph of the
syllabus of Cuyahoga Abstract Title & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio
St. 23, 193 N.E. 65030
Piecemeal attacks by the injunctive or declaratory judgement process
against individual lay practitioners are inadequate to test the legal issue
involved. The Commission and Bureau operate a state-wide compensa-
tion system which demands a uniform rule on compensation practice,
Only the Ohio Supreme Court can resolve the current dilemma.
OLIVER SCHROEDER, JR.
30. Id. at 429-30, 200 N.E. at 471-72.
